An experimental study of certain relationships between debaters' attitudes and win-loss records by Barnes, Vernon Leray.
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OP CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS
BETwEliN DEBATERS' ATTITUDES
AND «IIN-.LOSS RECORDS
by
VERNON LERAY BARNES
B, A., Ottawa University, 1957
A MASTER'S THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OP ARTS
Department of Speech
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1961|.
Approved by:
Hajorrrpressor
201/
f
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Th« author wishes to extend his sinoere appreci-
ation and gratitude to his graduate adviser. Dr. Terry
Welden, for tactX'ul guidenco and consistent oncoaragement
and to the aesoclate njembers of hia committee. Dr. Donald
Darnell, Dr. Norma Bimtoa, and i)r. Phillip iiice, for theii
constructive criticisms, sugi^estions, and encoiiragement.
li
COMfESTS
kCfumni^mMtimtB. ii
Chapter
I, I!ITRv>DUCTiJS, ,.,..... 1
£«oIcgz*oun4 of th» i>t\iAf
R«vl«w of th« Llter«tur«
Juatiflofttlon for the £»tu<iy
IX* m[?Qfm&B& 35
III, DESI08 OF ^rat STUDY 40
Statistioel Hypotheses an<) Methodology
IV« RESULTS ASD DISCOSSIOIf • . • • . 1^7
Deaopiption of the Dete
Stat it tl eel Anelyele
Suaeery
Dlaoueeion
KuggestloQe for Further Study
AFPSIDIX, * . $5
A SELECTED BiaUOORAPHT • . . • • $7
I. INTRODUCTION
Th« purpose of this study is to investigate the
effects of a debater's attitude towards a debate topic on
his effectiveness in debating the topic and the effects of
his tournament debating of that topic on his attitudes
toward the topic.
Background of the Study
Any study of the importance of a debaters' attitude
towards the question he is debating is rooted in the contro-
versy over two-aided debating. The common practice in the
early years of competitive debate usually involved two
colleges contracting to hold a public debate on a designated
topic. £ach school was as sinned a given aide to defend and
two debaters from each school were selected to uphold the
assigned position. Debate practice and procedure has changed
considerably since these early years. Today complicated
tourna-nents are held involving many schools entering several
teams each to participate in a series of from four to eight
debates, alternating from one side of the topic to the other
without regard to the speaker's real convictions. The
presence of an audience in a contemporary debate tournament
is extremely rare. These changes in debate procedure have
•timulated the controversy over the wisdom of two-sided
debating during the past half-century.
I
2Senator Albert J. Beveridge has charged that "the
practice in high schools and colleges of appointing debate
teams to support or oppose propositions, regardless of what
"1
the debaters believe, is questionable—Indeed, bad.
Richard Murphy claims that "Debate would be In a stronger
position if it were freed from the anachronistic practice
of multiple positions. And those who believe in the essen-
tial processes of democratic debate and wish to extend them,
would no longer be held liable for a dubious practice, if the
debate-both-sides policy were abandoned.
Those writers, such as Beveridge and Murphy, who
oppose the practice of permitting, or requiring, high school
and college students to debate both sides of a resolution
have raised the following three questions: (l) Is it
ethical for a debater to argue both sides of a proposition?
(2) Is two-sided debate essential to the tournament debate
situation? (3) Is two-sided debate necessary to teach
objectivity and tolerance?
Two-Sided Debate—Ethics
The controversy over the ethics of two-sided debating
appears to have been generated from Theodore Roosevelt's
statement in his 1913 Autobiography that he was "exceedingly
glad" that as a student at Harvard he had never "practiced
^ The Art of Public Speateing (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1921|) pp. 23-2I4.,
2 "The Ethics of Debating Both Sides," The Speech
Teacher . VI, tio, 1, January 1957 1 P. 9.
debating." He said he had "not the slightest sympathy with
debating contests in which each side is arbitrarily assigned
a given proposition and told to maintain it without the least
reference to whether those raaintaining it believed in it or
not*""^ It might be interesting to note that the man who
defeated Roosevelt for the Presidency in 1912 was also aware
of this controversy, for, as Dayton D, McKean reports,
"Woodrow «/ilson as a senior in oolle^^e refused to participate
In a prize debate when drawing lots put him on the side op-
posite his belief* But as a debate counsellor at Princeton,
he once advised a debater not to worry about opposing his
own conviction, but to center on his opposition to Harvard."**-
"He (Wilson) was very insistent, says the Reverend R. F.
Stirling, that we read, think, write, and debate on both
sides. "^ Wilson seemed to agree with Roosevelt as a student
that debating against conviction was ethically or morally
wrong, but as a teacher he apparently believed that there
were educational values in two-sided debating. Theodore
Roosevelt's uncompromising position was explained when he
said, "What we need is to turn out of our colleges men with
ardent convictions on the side of the right, not young men who
oan make a good argueraent for either right or wrong as their
^ An Autobiot^raphy (New York: The HacMillan Company,
1913). p. 2tn
^ Dayton D. McKean, "Woodrow Milson as a debate coach."
The quarterly uournal ol Speech . XVI, (i^iovember, 1930 )» P» k^O,
^ McKean., p. 14-59.
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Interest bids them.** Roosevelt and Wilson did not resolve
the issue of two-sided debating, they merely identified the
problem and clarified the issues at stake. Durinf? the half-
century followinp: these statesmen, the ar^ment has become
even more hotly contested.
One of the conditions responsible for the increased
Interest In the controversy over the ethics of deb'5tine both
sides has been the chanisres within the debate r^roffrara. Murt>hy
Identified the most fundamental of these changes when he
reported that
. , . with the firm establishment of the tournament
system, which received its fi;reatest i'moetus in the
thirties, there has been a prowin? tendency not only
to Ignore conviction and side, but also to incorporate
debating both sides as a part of the structure, T'or
example, the West oint ^Jatlonal Invitational Tourna-
ment requires that 'Teams debate oopoeite sides of the
question an equal number of times,* Whereas in the
older systems rolicy was larprely a matter of individual
schools and coaches, now one either debates both sides
or he does not debate at all, or at least not in tourna-
ments such as the safest oint. An ethic has now been
imposed. '
Nearly all hifi^h school debate tournaments In Itansas,
with the exception of the District and State DebPte Tourna-
ments sponsored by the Kansas State High School Activities
Association and a small number of invitational tournaments
desi/3;ned to prepare teams for the District and State con-
tests, require students to debate both sides of the tonic.
Two-sided debating is also the nearly universal practice of
Mid-Western intercolegiate debate tournaments,
° Roosevelt, p. 20,
1
'^ Murt^hy, v, 2.
This element of compulsion, of forcing a student to
debate against his convictions seems to be the most objection-
able characteristic of modern debate to the opponents of two-
sided debate. If debate is to be considered the art of public
speaking, or as persuasion, then it is subject to ethical
Judgment. Murphy contends that "modern debate is not dialec-
tical; it is rhetorical; it appeals for judgment, for accept-
ance. And audiences, even if sparce at times, are present,"^
By using this rationale. Murphy claims that "The argument
against debating both sides is very simple and consistent.
Debate, the argument goes. Is a form of public speaking, A
public statement is a public commitment." Beverldge phrased
this argument in the strongest possible language when he
stated that public speaking, " . . , means of coxorse, utter
sincerity. Never under any circvimstances or for any reward
tell an audience what you, yourself, do not believe or are
even indifferent about. To do so is immoral and worse—it is
mIO
to be a public liar. Karl R, Wallace cautioned against
thli problem when he suggested that "... the worst evil
which follows from an Indifference to means is that we make
easy the Intent of the dishonest. Insincere speaker. It Is
easy to assert high-sounding purposes; it is difficult for
the listener to assess the sincerity of these assertions,
® Murphy, p. 2^6.
^ Murphy, p. 2.
10 Beverldge, p. 23-24,
6In short, as Mahatma Gandhi often told us, EvU means, even
for a fjjood end, produce evil results. '•^^ The harshness of
the statements of Bcveridi^e and Wallace must he Intemreted
In their proper context. They were referring to public
sceaklng in <?eneral; not debate In Dartlculsr, The o-nnonente
of two-sided debate level these charges at debate in T!articiil.ar
on the grounds that debate is more than an artificial teaching
device which bears no relationship to real life situations,
but that debate is public streaking and is therefore sub.leot
to the ethical standards of nubile advocnicy or persuasion,
which will not tolerate insincerity, inconsistency, or con-
flict of interests. Wallace contends that the comraunioator
must always ask himself this question, "Can T freely admit
the force of opttosing evidence and argument and still advocate
a position which represents my convictions?** An even
greater responsibility was iraolied by '^rphy when he claimed
that "to argue in contemporary times that a r^ublic speaker
who has read and discussed his question shall not bring to the
deliberation any oersonal conviction, but shall le?ve it to
an audience which may never have heard the matter deliberated
before, is to resign the moral responsibility of the s-neakerr^^
Wallace warns that '^Communication Is in dans^er of being re-
garded as merely an art of personal success and prestige and
Wallace, p. 3.
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Wallace, p. 9.
^^ MurDhy, p. 4.
of being forgotten as the Indispensable art of social persua-
sion. "li<-
Brooks Qulraby, one of the strongest opponents of the
debate-both-aides policy, has summed up his position and the
position of hie fellow critics in this statement: "Our
democracy needs men and women of principle, who will weigh
the arguments before they become advocates, rather than men
and women trained to take either side at the flip of a coin. "^5
Those writers, such as Tnompson, Smith, Cripe,
McBurney, and Auer, who defend debating both sides of a debate
topic strongly deny the charge of unethical conduct. Not
only do they defend the ethics of two-sided debate, they
praise the practice as an exceptionally fine teaching device.
Since, as Kurphy has pointed out, "there has been a growing
tendency ... to incorporate debating both sides as a part
of the tournament structui^e" one must conclude that most
coaches of debate are mjre interested in universaliaing ths
practice than of discontinuing It.
Nicholas Cripe, in his article, "Debating both sides
in tournaments is ethical," defended the educational values
of two-sided debate when he reported that
His [the tournament debater' s 3 purpose, is to con-
vince the judges that he and his partner are the
better debaters. (This s-iould not be construed to
mean that the purpose of any school debate program
is only the winning of debates. It is merely that
winning debates is just one of the best methods yet
Ik Wallace, p. 2.
^^ "But is it Educational^", Speech Activities . IX,
(Summer, 1953 )» P. 20,
8devised of to get busy students to do the research
of material, the analysis, the mastering of the modes
of reasoning, and the principles of refutation, the
delivery necessary to make them into effective,
intelligent, and i*esponsible debaters. /•'•^
One of the strongest arguments against the ethics of debating
both sides was that it developed dishonest or hypocritical
traits in debaters. «»ayne Thompson answered this charge in
this manner:
Debating both sides of a pi'oposition is neither
morally wrong nor hypocritical. Some writers have
charged that debating both sides results in various
evils, such as insincerity, shallowness, and the
presentation of arguments known to be poorly founded
or fallacious. These malpractices which also occur
among speakers who debate only one side are the
result of other causes—weaknesses in the character
of the offender or a misunderstanding of the proper
function of debate. ^7
McBumey, 0« Belli, and Mills, writing to the same point,
relate that
Once a cause has been undertaken, the advocate has
a responsibility to present the best possible case
for his proposition within the limits of the facts
as he knows them or believes them to be. de should
not deliberately do less nor does he have any moral
right to attempt more, iio man has a moral right to
lie, cheat, or Intentionally diaj[;ort, much less a
responsibility to do so . , . .^^
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, speaking directly to the sub-
ject of a students de Dating both sides did not seeza to be
The Speech Teacher , VI, (September, 1957). p. 211.
*' Wayne D, Thompson, "Discussion and Debate: A
Re-examination," quarterly Journal of Speech . XXX, (October,
19l^i^), pp. 200-299.
19 James H. McBurney, James M, O'Heill, and Glen E,
Mills, Arpjumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free Society
.
(Kew York: i'ae Hacnilllan Company, 1951), p. i^..
9concerned about ethical hazzards when they said " . • . It
would not undermine hl« moral character if he did [debate
against his conviction. D " Ewbank and Auer expressed the
same opinion when they stated that "iiven if debaters are
assigned to the aide of the question in which they do not
believe, it does not necessarily follow that the experience
on
la harmful . . . •" The authorities cited have clearly
stated that debating both sides of a debate topic does not
violate moral or ethical standards.
One of the most fundamental argvunents used by those
authorities who contend that debating against conviction
does not violate acceptable ethical standards is that debate
is not public advocacy in the same manner that a legislator,
lawyer, or salesman use persuasion. They claim that it is
an effective pedagogical device for the teaching techniques
of persuasion. Thompson illustrated the point that
Debating is not properly a form of persuasion ....
The thesis that debate is a form of persuasion rests
upon the premise that ideas should be imposed upon
the public, whereas the thesis that debate should be
a form of investigation and testing a proposed solution
rests upon the premise that both sides should be gx
presented and that the listeners should make the decision.
Cripe argued along the same line when he wrote that
19 James Milton 0« Weill, Craven Laycock, and Robert
Leighton Scales, Argumentation and Debate . (New York: The
HacMillan Company, 1917). P. 37^.
^^ Henry L, Ewbank and J. Jeffrey Auer, Discussion
and Debate: Tools of a Democracy , (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, inc., 1951). p. Uo5*
21 Thompson, p. 288.
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Hie basic error in reasoning of those who condemn
speaking on both sides in school debate tournaments
is their failure to make a distinction between
tournament debating and other forms of public argu-
mentative speaking. It is my contention that inter-
scholastic debating is ft different form of public
speaking from debate that we hear the legislator or
the lawyer use, ^
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills warned debaters not to make the
mistake of confusing contest debate with public debate when
they suggested that "the student should keep in mind the
differences between actual life situations, such as legis-
lature, court, or campaign, and the situation in school
or contest debates," -^
The advocates of two-sided debating, then, led by
authorities such as ITaompson, Gripe, Ewbank, Auer, and
McBurney, argue that debate is a useful tool in teaching
persuasion, but that it is not persuasion in the sense
that support for a cause is sought. They reason that the
judge is present to evaluate the relative effectiveness of
the debaters', not the merits of the question. The advo-
cates of two-sided debating claim that debaters develop
greater open-mindedness and objectivity by debating both
aides than they could receive by debating only one side,
Two-Sided Debate—£^8sential
Related to the question of whether debating both
sides of a proposition is beneficial or harmful to the
22 Cripe, p. 210
^3 McBurney, et, al., p. I4.
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tudent of debate and to the public image of debate is the
practical question of whether the present system of tournament
debate contests on a single national topic could exist with-
out requiring a debater to alternate sides. If it were true
that tournament debating could not function efficiently with-
out two-sided debating, then two-sided debating might be
justified as a "necessary evil". If debating both sides of
a resolution is not' essential to the tournament system then
one must conclude that the existence of the practice is one
of choice, namely, that the directors of debate in the
United States prefer two-sided debating for its intrinsic
values.
Murphy argued that two-sided debating is not
essential to tournament situations when he asserted that
"... the both-sides methodology is not now and never has
been an essential element in debate • • . • To believe that
to debate one must debate both sides is to ignore what actual
practice is."^ "Since debate questions are purposely framed
to provide a division of opinion, there should be available
speakers on either side of the matter, speakers who really
believe their own arguments," -^ Murphy concluded. This
•rgURient might be valid if debaters were equally divided by
conviction of the specific affirmative or negative sides
involved. Nicholas Gripe attempted to refute this assumption
^ Murphy, p. 6,
^5 Murphy, p. 3.
i
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by alleging that "... a great many schools could not
debate unless some means could be found so that the few
ethical affirmative or negative teams in the country would
not be overworked. "^^ Mr. Gripe suggested that it frequently
happens that an entire debate squad may favor one aide of a
question. He continued his argument by citing these two
examples:
For instance, the University of Vermont could not
have had a debate team in 19^0 when it won the West
Point Tournament if the Murphy suggestion of debating
only the aide believed to be rif;ht had been followed
.... Likewise, Grinnell Coliere wojild have been
unable to have a team in 1953 * • • •'
Even though it must be admitted that debate has in the past
and oould now operate without requiring students to debate
both sides, it would certainly create sticky administrative
and technical problems to overcome In achieving the simplicity
and efficiency of the present system.
Another school of thought relating to the importance
of two-sided debating in the classroom as well as in the
tournament situation justifies the practice of alternating
sides on the grounds that it give* the debater valuable
experience in preparing and delivering both affirmative and
negative cases. The last three national high school debate
topics were on the subjects of "ICederal aid to education",
"free trade", and "socialized medicine". It does not seem
too unlikely that a significant number of high school debaters
^^ Cripe, p. 210.
27 Cripe, p. 210.
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either favored or ox^rosed all of these three tor^lcs. Tf
this were the case and a hls^h school debater were reonlred to
debate only his conviction, then a si/mlficant number of
debaters raisjht have never debated in oomretltlon one or the
other side of a question. Since the tournament debate
situation is expected to Drovido an intensive practical
experience in prenarinp; and delivering both the affirmative
and negative cases, then two-sided debating!? seems ej^sential
to the system.
Two-sided Debate—Objectivity
One of the most worthwhile ends of debate is to
develop habits of open-mindedness, objectivity, and toler-
ance of other points of view, Thonroson claimed that two-
sided debate is educationally more soimd than one-sided
debate when he sugs^ested that
Teaching students to investiP"-ite both sides of a
position and to compare and contrast them before
making a decision is more desirable educationally
than teaching them how to convince others to accept
their point of view . . , , Students who evaluate
both sides are better equipped to solve their
individual problems than those who are persuaders
.... By debatlni? both sides, he is more likely
to realize that propositions Tire bilateral. It is
those who fail to recognize this fact who become
intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted. 28
Theodore Bilsici expressed a similar attitude when he said
"Debating Itself does not reouire a person to predetermine
his stand on a proposition and then investigate the problem
solely to 'bolster* his side of the argument. In fact,
28 Thompson, pp. 294-296.
Ik
debating not only encourages but it deraanda an "open mind"
29in the investigation and analysis of a proposition. Murphy
attacked the heart of this argument by replying that you do
not have to debate both aides to establish tolerance and
objectivity, but you should "brief both sides." He claims
that you can "study" opposing argtiraenta without advocating
30
them.-^ All of the authorities cited seemed to agree that
debating both sides or debating one side but studying the
other side developed open mindednesa and objectivity.
The questions raised concerning the ethics, value*
and utility of two-aided debating to contemporary debate
procedure by writers in the field of speech are related to
the question of the effects of tournament debating on a
debater's attitude toward the topic he is debating. If the
arguments made by the critics of two-sided debating about
the importance of a speaker's oortonitment to his public
statements are valid, then a debater's attitude should
have some effect on his debating of a resolution. If the
advocates of two-aided debating are correct in asserting that
debating creates open-minded nes a, then the act of debating
both sides of a resolution should have some effect on a
debater's attitude toward the topic under discussion.
29 Theodore Bilski, "Directing the Debate Program",
Teachers College Journal , Ho, 314., (December, 1962), p, 96.
30 Murphy, p. 4,
1>^
Review of the Literature
A review of the liter-ature in speech related fields
revealed several studies which attempted to measure attitude,
to determine if attitude shifted as a result of debating one
or both sides of a proposition, and to explain the cause of
these shifts in attitude,
Donald G, Hay experimented with an attitude scale
developed by Dr. L, L* Thurstone, a psychologist at the
University of Chicago, Hay administered this attitude test
to a thirty-member debate audience immediately before and
after hearing a public debate. He found that "This indicated
an apparent shift from a less favorable attitude toward
'increasing the powers of the President as a penaanent policy'
to a slightly more favorable attitude after hearing the
debate."^ Hay continued his report by warning that since
the difference in the mean attitude scores was only about
twice the probable error of the difference no meaningful
conclusions should be drawn except for the need of further
experimentation in this field,
Clayton H, Sohug conducted a study to determine
if possible, what effect one's debating on a given side
of a debate proposition rnieiht have on one's attitude
toward that proposition. In other words do debaters
tend to become "more strongly in favor of," or "more
strongly opposed to" the particular side of the
proposition defended; or do they remain, by and large,
unchanged in attitude v32
31 "Debate and the Measurement of Attitudes,"
Quarterly Joiirnal of Speech , XXLI, (February, 1936), pp. 62-66,
32 "a Study of attitude change toward debate propo-
sitions among high school and college debaters". Speech Teacher
,
III, (January, 1954 )» P. 15.
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To measure the debaters* attitude, Schug administered the
"Woodward Shift of Opinion ballot" before and after the
debate season to 225 debaters who debated only one side of
nine different national high school and colle;'e debate topics.
Schug' s investigation proved extremly productive in measuring
the direction of attitude shifts as a result of debating one
side of a topic. An analysis of Schug' s data revealed that
of those subjects who debated the affirmative; 1^5 pez* cent
favored the proposition, l\.l\. per cent were undecided, and
11 per cent opposed the proposition. Of those who debated the
negative; 16 per cent favored the proposition, 27 per cent
were undecided, and 57 per cent were opposed to the propo-
•ition."^^ The attitudes cited above were measured before the
debate season. These findings would also seem to indicate
that debaters, if given a choice, have a strong tendency to
debate the side of the question which agrees with their
convictions. Schug' s data showed that 75 pej* cent of the
debaters who favored the proposition debated the affir-Tiative
side of the topic while 83 per cent of the debaters who
opposed tne proposition debated the negative side.-^'' Schug
summarized his findings in the following conclusions:
1. There was a rather pronoxinced tendency for debaters
generally to move to positions more favorable to the
side upheld, although approximately one-fifth re-
mained unchanged in attitude, while another one-fifth
33 Schug, p. 16,
^k Schug, p. 16,
35 Schug, p. 16.
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actually shifted to positions leas favorable to their
side of the question.
2. There was a considerably greater tendency for the
negative debaters to shift to attitudea more favorable
to their own side than for the affirmative to do so;
also, the afflmatlve debaters moved more readily
than did the negative toward positions less favorable
to their particular side,
3« Although the data for this study covered a wide
variety of debate topics over a period of several
years, there was a definite tendency for the negative
to outgain the affirmative for adherents among the
debaters. 36
Robert B, Capel measured the affects of a season*
•
debating on 213 high school debaters.-*' Of these, kk per cent
recorded significant attitude shifts. Debaters with strong
affirmative or negative opinions at the beginning of the
season v/ere likely to hold moderate beliefs at its close.
The 23 who debated on both sides of a question tended to
move toward a more neutral position. This latter finding
tends to substantiate the assumption that debating both
sides Induces neutrality in attitude. The study, however,
does not give any indication of what shift, if any, occurred
in those who had moderate opinions at the beginning of the
season. No reference is made as to whether such debaters
became more moderate or more extreme in their views. The
findings reported by Schug and Capel appear at first glance
to be in conflict, Schug found that when students debate
one side of a question, and favor the side upheld, that they
^^ Schug, p. 19.
37 See the unoubl, diss. (Wisconsin, 19i4.1) by Robert B,
Capel, "The £.frectlvenee& of Hl:/h School Debate in Providing
Information and Influencing Attitudes.", p. 1,
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tend to strengthen or reinforce their pre-season attitudes,
Capel found that when a student debates on either one or both
sides of a topic he weakens his pre-season attitude or moves
toward neutrality. If we are to assume that both studies are
reliable, then the explanation of the different conclusions
might rest with the fact that one group debated both sides of
the question. An examination of relevant literature may-
provide a clue to the answer of this difference,
Geraldine Welden conducted a study at the University
of Pittsburg to compare the attitude shifts of students who
debated one side of a proposition with students who debated
38both sides of a propositions. To accomplish this purpose
Welden designed her experiment In the following manner:
To determine any change of attitude, an attitude
questionnaire was constructed and administered to
college debaters at the beginning of a debate season
and the identical questionnaire was administered six
months later at the close of the debate season. For
this purpose the Thurstone-Chave attitude measuring
technique was employed. It was applied in measuring
the attitudes of Pennsylvania College debaters on the
1955-^6 national intercollegiate debate proposition
"Resolved: that the non-agricultural industries of
the United States should guarantee their employees an
annual wage,-^'
The population used by Melden in this study included 91
debaters. Of these 91 debaters, 2I4. debated only the ai flrra-
ative, 26 debated only the negative, and i^l debated both sides
of the proposition. The following conclusions were drawn
from the data compiled:
38 See the unpubl, thesis (Pittsburg, 1957) by Geraldine
Seth Welden, "Shifts of Opinion of i>elected Pennsylvania College
Debaters on the 1955-56 National Topic as a i''unction of Debating
one or both sides of the Proposition.", p. 1,
39 i»/el4en, p, 17.
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In this study it appeared that debaters generally debated
the side of the question they favored during the entire
season. The majority of those who had no strong attitude
to begin with debated both sides of the proposition before
the season concluded. Once the groups had been determined
as a result of the post testing it became apparent that
the debaters in the three groups (affirmative, negative,
both sides) were distinct from one another in attitudes
both at the beginning of the season and at the end of
the season. Fvirther analysis revealed that the debaters
in these groups did not shift significantly in attitude
after a period of six months of debating the proposition
on which they were measured.
If one basic conclusion could be drawn it would be as
follows: those who debated the guaranteed annual wage
for six months on only one side of the proposition did
not become more favorable in attitude toward that side
of the proposition; those who debated both sides of the
pjropositlon did not become more neutral in attitude as
a result of debating both sides, in fact, those debaters
who debated one side oriplnally expressed themselves as
favorable to the side upheld. Those who debated both
sides of the piroposition had no strong attitudes originally
either way.40
Welden's study does not seem to resolve or explain the
Schug-Capel conflict, but it questions their findings. Hay
found that when an audience hears a debate there is a tendency
for the initial attitude of the audience to be weakened and
to move toward congruity. Capel found basically the same
thing to be true for debater's who debate one or both sides
of a proposition, namely, that the initial attitude of the
debater will be weakened and tend to move toward neutrality.
Sohug found that when a debater debates only one side of a
proposition and his initial attitude favored that side his
initial attitude is strengthened or reinforced. Welden
discovered that debating one or both aides of a proposition
1^0 Welden, p. 33*
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had no significant effect on attitude. It seems painfully
apparent at this point that, in general, debating one or
both sides of a proposition either strenf^thens, weakens, or
has no effect on a debaters attitude.
None of the four studies cited above provided an
answer to the most fundamental question raised by the advo-
cates and critics of two-sided debating which was; what are
the effects of requiring a student to debate against his
convictions. The critics of two-sided debatJng ch^-re that
this practice makes the debater shallow, insincere, sad
dishonest with himself and the audience. The advocates of
debating reason that this practice developes critical thinking,
objectivity, and open-mindedness.
Schug's study, which was the most comprehensive of the
four, may shed some light on this question. Only Schug*
s
report recorded data relating to those debaters who did
debate against conviction.^^ Eleven oer cent of the affirm-
ative debaters in Schug's study opposed the topic. Of these
11 per cent who opposed the topic; 14.6 per cent remained
opposed in attitude, 23 per cent shifted to an undecided
position, while 31 per cent shifted to a favorable affirm-
ative position. In other words, Sk per cent of those
affirmative debaters who originally opposed the topic shifted
to a position more favorable to the topic. Also, I6 per cent
of the nef-ative debaters favored the topic (they debated
^^ Schug, pp. 16-17.
against conviction). Of these 16 per cent who favored the
topic; 2i|. per cent remained favorable to the topic, 12 per
cent shifted to an undecided position, while 65 per cent
shifted to an unfavorable position, in other words, 77
per cent of the negative debaters who originally favored
the topic shifted to a less favorable position. The same
condition was true of the debaters who were originally
undecided about the topic. Forty-four per cent of the
affirmative debaters were oriizinally undecided about the
topic. Of these 44 Pei* cent who were undecided; 62 per
cent shifted to a favorable affirmative position, 18
per cent shifted to an unfavorable affirmative position,
while only 20 per cent remained undecided about the topic.
In other words, 80 per cent of the affirmative debaters who
were originally xuidecided shifted to a position either
favorable or unfavorable to the topic. Twenty-seven per
cent of the negative debaters were originally undecided
about the topic. Of these 27 per cent who were undecided,
83 per cent shifted to a negative position, 10 per cent
shifted to an affirmative position, while only 7 P«r cent
remained undecided about the topic. In other words, 93 per
cent of the negative debaters who were originally undecided
about the topic shifted to a position either favorable or
unfavorable to the topic.^^ When Schug's data was evaluated
in this fashion an opportunity to measure the attitude shift
kz Schug, pp. 15-16,
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of debaters who debated a;i;alnst conviction was discovered.
Sohug demonstrated dramatically that Jebatera who argiie
against conviction weaken their initial attitude toward the
topic* In fact, two-third 8 of the debaters who argued ar-alnst
conviction moved to a position more compatible with the side
upheld. This conclusion, then, tenia to support the findings
of Hay and Capel, and to deny the conclusions drawn by Welden.
A review of the literature relating to studies attempt-
ing to determine the direction and degree of attitude shifts
among debaters who debate one or both sides of a prbpObition
has revealed the following findings: Capel discovered that
debating one or both sides of a proposition weakened the debater's
initial attitude causing him to move toward neutrality; Schug
found that debating one aide of a topic resulted in a shift
of the debater's original attitude to one more compatible with
the aide upheld; Welden failed to discover any significant
shift of opinion among debaters who debated one or both sides
of a topic; and Utterback foxmd that debate tended to strengthen
original attitudes while discussion appeared to weaken or
reverse Initial opinions.
One of the most common observations In the studies
cited previously was the finding that debaters, if given a
choice, prefer to debate on the side of the question they
favor. These studies also indicated that if two-sided debating
was permitted, most debaters who were undecided about the topic
^3 William E. Utterback, "The Influence of Conference
on Group Opinion," The .juarterly Journal of Speech . (1950),
36:3. pp. 365-370.
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generally chose to debate both sides or were willing to debate
the side which had the fewer adherents. This finding would
seem to indicate that debaters in general place a high ret^ard
on conviction.
The importance of conviction and sincerity was shown
In the controversy over two-sided debating. The critics of
two-sided debating condemned the practice on the grounds that
It was not conviction at stake, but the effectiveness of the
debater in s ipporting an assigned point of view with evidence,
argument, and effective delivery. The advocates of two-sided
debating also felt that the advantages received (critical
thinking, open-raindedness) more than compensated for the
disadvantage of debating against conviction.
The writers in the field of speech theory, practice,
and pedagogy b'='lieve that sincerity and conviction are essential
to effective speaking. Professor £. C, Buehler of Kansas
University stated in his textbook that "The surest and easiest
way to sell others on something is to be sold on it yourself.
The fires of enthusiasm are kindled from personal conviction
and personal belief, I have seen speakers frill again and
again as they labored painfully through their speeches, suddenly
electrify their audiences when they hit upon a subject close
to their hearts."^ Alan U. Monroe said "Straight-forward
sincerity is the best assurance of efsective speaking. ^^
hU You and Iqmv {Speeches , (i»awrence: Allen i'ress, 1957) P»28.;
45 Principles and Types of Speeches , (i^d ed«, Wew York:
Scott, Porosraan and Company , 1914-9 ) , d. 56.
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Both of these men who are highly respected as authorities on
the teaching of effective speech principles rank sincerity and
conviction as essential to effective public speaking. Brembeck
and Howell also recognized the importance of sincerity and
conviction, but felt the terma require a more coraprehensiva
definition and explanation.
That moat authorities advise the speaker to be
sincere is evident, although what they mean by sincer-
ity is not always clear, "Dedication to a cause' and
* Profound intellectual conviction' are listed frequently
as characteristics of the sincere speaker.
We can identify three orders of sincerity: primary
sincerity , consisting of unreserved belief in the
persuasive proposition; secondary sincerity , stenualng
from a conviction that securing acceptance of the
persuasive proposition is socially desirable, regardless
of the persuader's personal feolimss toward the specific
proposition; and tertiary sincerity , resting on the
persuader's personal reward from the act of persuasion,
but being disinterested in truth of the proposition
and its social consequences.^
While it is true that a high school or college debater
Olght utilize priniary, secondary, or tertiary sincerity, he
is more likely to exhibit tertiary sincerity. The reason
that a debater would demonstrate tertiary sincerity is that
debates are not conunonly judged on the debaters' ability to
persuade the Judge to accept his position, but on who did the
"beat job of debating." Brembeck and iloweli continued their
discussion of sincerity by providiaj insight into the factors
Involved in secondary and tertiary sincerity,
^ Winston Lamont Brembeck and William Smiley Howell,
Persuasion: A Means of Social Conti'ol, (iJew York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.}, pp, 254-255.
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Two comments may be made concerning persuasive
speaking that rests on secondary or tertiary sincerity.
Rationalization is always involved, enabling the speaker
to live comfortably with himself .... As the high
correlation of belief and desire would lead us to
expect, the persuasive speaker tends, over a period of
time, to increase his belief in his central proposition.
Writers on mass communication note the tendency of propa-
gandists to believe their own propaganda. The paid advo-
cate may develop a 'profound conviction' I
Prom the viewpoint of the audience, it may be
difficult or Impossible to discriminate among primary,
secondary, and tertiary sincerity of the persuasive
speaker.
Prom the viewpoint of the speaker, primary sincerity
la to be preferred, if he is unskilled, he will be unable
to say something he does not believe with conviction,
while great confidence in his message may help him in
overcoming deficiencies in rhetoric and delivery. But
the skilled persuader can probably weave as durable a
fabric of ethos with the coarse fibers of secondary or
tertiary sincerity as he can with the finer thread of
genuine faith in the action he advocates.^'
Three of the ideas contained in this selection from Brembeck
and Howell support the findings of authorities previously
cited in this report and one idea suggests an area of further
investigation. The statement that propagandists tend to
believe their own propaganda was supported by Schug's study
which discovered that two-thirds of the debaters studied who
debated against conviction shift their attitudes to positions
more compatible with the side upheld. Wallace, Beveridge, and
Murphy condemned debating against conviction as dishonest and
unethical because the audience would be led to believe that
the debater's pretended conviction was real. Brembeck and
Howell explain that this occurs because the audience is not
^' Brembeck and Howell, pp. 256-2^7.
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able to distinguish between primary, secondary, and tertiary
sincerity , Beuhler and Itonro* iiiiplied that an inexperienced
or Ineffective speaker could not give an effective speech
without primary sincerity, Brerabock and Howell suggest that
while this is true for inexperienced speakers, it is not true
of effective speakers. A fourth statement made by Brembeck
and Howell suggests the operation of a phenoinonon related to
aecondary and tertiary sincerity which has not been previously
discussed. This was the statement that when one is required
to uphold a position he does not subscribe to in order to
achieve some expected rewai'd that "Rationalization is always
involved, enabling the speaker to live cowfortably with
himself . . . ."^®
This phenoraonon which Brembeck and Howell implied is
called "cognitive dissonance" by Leon Festinger. While
Charles £. Osgood, George J« Suci, and Perry H, Tannenbaum
refer to this concept as the "theory of congruity.''
Peatinger, a psychologist at Stanford University,
developed and refined the theory of cognitive dissonance
with the aid of a Ford Foundation grant. By "cognition,"
Festinger means " . • • any knowledge, opinion* or belief
about the environment, about oneself, or about one's
behavior. "^^ By "dissonance," Festinger ineans "inconsistency,"
An example of cognitive dissonance at work might be found in
^ Brembeck and Howell, p. 256.
^' A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
, (Evanston,
Illinois: Row, i'eterson and Company, 1957), f>p. 2-3.
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the recent pjo-rernment report on health and lung cancer, A
habitual smoker who helieves and behaves consistently with the
notion that the benefits of smokinf? outweif^h th€5 disadvantages
encountered dissonance when the government reT>ort linked
lung cancer -with smoking and presented powerful, convincing
evidence to the fact that the risks Involved In smoking
greatly exceed any derived advantap'es. *'estlns:er*s cognitive
dissonance theory would t'redict this behavior pattern for a
person with this tyoe of dissonance: first, "The existence
of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and
achieve consonance," and second, "When dissonance is t)re sent,
in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively
avoid situations and information which would likely increase
50the dissonance."-' In this case, the sub,1ect in the example
would either quit smoking; rationalize his habit by finding
new advantages; discount the accuracy and credibility of the
rei^ort; or ignore the report and avoid any contact with
information, particularly persuasive, relating to the hazards
of smoking, i^estlnger ert)lalned this type of cognitive
dissonance when he stated that "The basic background of the
theory consists of the notion that the human organism tries to
establish internal harmony, consistency, or congrulty among
his opinions, attitudes, knowledge, and values. That is, there
la a drive toward consonance among cognitions, "^^
*^ Festinger, p, 3.
Festinger, p, 260,
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Festiager continued by stating that several situations may
indicate or imply the existence of cof^aitive dissonance.
1, Dissonance almost always exists after a decision
has been made between two or more alternatives.
2. Dissonance almost always exists after an atterrot
has been made, by offering rewards or threatening
punishment, to elicit overt behavior that Is at variance
with private or^inion,
3» forced or accidental excosure to new information
may create cognitive elements that are dissonant ¥rith
existing cognition.
4* The open expression of dlseptreement in a icroup leads
to the existence of cognitive dissonance in the members,
5« Identical dissonance in a large number of T^eople may
be created when an event occurs wh3ch is so comrielling
as to produce a uniform reaction in everyone, 52
The high school debate student would be expected to encounter
most of these types of dissonance; therefore, the theory of
cognitive dissonance might help to explain his attitude shift
as a result of debating one or both sides of a proTosition,
Since a debater required to support both sides of a nropo-
sition can not avoid cognitive dissonance he will be under
pressure to reduce this dissonance. ?estinger states that
*The strength of the pressiire to reduce dissonance is a
function of the magnitude of the existing dissonance, "53
There are several things a debater could do to reduce disson-
ance: (1) The debater could change his opinion to one more
congruous to two-sided debating—neutrality; (2) seek additional
information to bolster his own opinion; (3) subconslously
52 Pestinger, vv, 261-262,
^^ I'estinger, p. 263.
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misinterpret or misconceive alien information; (i|.) reject
the op5.nion of those who diaagree; (5) reorganize the importance
of other copjnitive element8--that is sayinjr "winning :?ebate8
and becoming a good speaker are really more important than my
personal opinion"; or (6) if the dissonance is too ^reat, he
may refuse to debate against conviction or quit debating
entirely, in which case his oric.inal opinion would be strength-
ened. Pestinger does warn, however, that individuals have
different levels of tolerance for dissonance and that the
pressure to reduce dissonance may vary accordingly. £ven
though tolerance levels are not uniform, a principle may be
stated which will control tolerance levels for all individuals.
"The maximum dissonance which can exist between two elements
is equal to the resistance to change of the less resistant of
the two elements. If the dissonance exceeds this magnitude,
the less resistant cognitive element will be changed, thus
reducing the dissonance, -^^ The theory of cognitive dissonance,
then, provides an insight into why a debater's attitude does
or does not change as a result of debating, and makes possible
the prediction of the direction and degree of this change in
attitude.
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum discovered the "principle
of congruity" in their study of the "semantic differential. "5«
Sk Festinger, pp. 266-271.
55 Pestinger, p. 266.
5^ Charles E, Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy fl,
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Heaning , (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1957), PP. 169-216.
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The principle of congruity was sumnarlzed as follows:
The congruity principle appears to be a very general
process operating whenever cognitive events interact.
These interactions are such that the representational
processes characteristic of related signs are modified
toward congruity with each other, degree of modification
being inversely proportional to the original intensities
of the processes in isolation. 57
Successful results were obtained at the University of Illinois
by these three men in predicting attitude change. Osgood, Sucl,
and Tannenbaum reported that "... the principle of congruity
yields reasonably accurate predictions. Methodologically it
should be emphasized that it is the use of the semantic dif-
ferential as a generalized attitude scale that makes it
possible to test 4;hia principle. -^
Since the most common method of testing the principle
of congruity Is through the use of the semantic differential,
a brief review of this instrument would be pertinent to this
study. "The semantic differential la essentially a combination
of controlled association and scaling procedures. "^^ Darnell
describes the semantic differential (SD) as
... a means of eliciting subjects' responses that
Indicate which member of a pair of adjectives is more
closely associated with a particular concept, and the
Intensity of that association. In its most comimon
form, the SD form looks like this:
57
Osgood, et al., p. 216.
^^ Osgood, et al., p. 212,
5° Osgood, et al,, p. 20,
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TREE
good
happy
large
: : : I
: : : :
: : : :
bad
sad
small
The subject (S) is instruoted to mark in the middle
of the scale if the adjectives at either end are equally
associated with the concept at the tot> of the oasre. If
one is more closely assocleted then the other, S can
Indicate "extremely" (by marking the box next to the
stronger associate), "quite" (by markiner the second box
from the stronger associate), or "slightly** (by marking
the third box from the stronger associate—next to the
center).
It is assumed that an adequate samtle of such scales
would ; rovlde a fairly specific profile of S»s meaning
for a concept. oO
""
By assigning the digits one through seven to each of the
boxes and by using a number of scales an accurate statistical
measure of e subject's attitude toward a conce^i^t can be
identified on the multi -dimensional semantic differential.
The semantic differential is extremely useful to the con-
gruity principle in that it can measure statistically shifts
of opinion between pre and post-tests.
An examination of the se:!iantic differential form
cited previously (TREE) reveals one problem which mi^ht emerge
if the semantic differential were used indiscriminatly. The
adjectives "good-bad"* and "large-small • would seem to describe
a "tree** more accurately for most people than would "ha^-oy-sad"
.
Darnell conducted a study to imtjrove the method of selecting
°® 3ee the unrubl. diss. (Michiiran State, I964) by
Donald Keith Darnell, •»A Techniaue for Determlnin/or the
Evaluative Discrimination Caoaolty and ' olarlty of *?emantic
Differential Scales for Specific Concepts", vv, 2-3,
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highly dlacrlinlnatory scales for use with the semantic
61
differential. The method develooed for thia purpose was
to test the scales independently by instructing the subjects
to Identify the "best imaginable" (S) and "worst Imaginable"
(w) exaniole of the concept evaluated. This allows the subject
to make an objective aa well as an evaluative judgment about
the conceot. The subject in this caa* might interpret the
"best imaginable" tree as "quite large" and the "worst imagin-
able" tree as "extreniely small". If the majority of subjects
interpret the "best" and "worst i.ma; inable" tree as neither
or both "happy" or "sad" then Darnell would have the scale
discarded as being non-discriminatory or non-evaluative for
the concept. Another finding by Darnell related to the
polarity of the scales selected. A person who believes that
the "best imaginable" tree is "quite large" might also believe
that the "best imaginable" woman la quite small. In cases
such as this the polarity of the scales would have to be
reversed since a scale such as "large-small" could have either
a positive or a negative meaning with different concepts.
The semantic differential developed by Osgood and Suci in 1952
and modified by Darnell seems to provide a reliable index to
attitude.
Robert S, Ooyer of Ohio State linked congrulty with
the semantic differential when he said "with the exception of
the semantic differential, I know of no standardized instrument
61 Darnell, p. l\2.
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to meaBure, Indirectly or otherwise, dissonance. "°2 Goyer
suggested even broader possibilities for the use of the
semantic differential when he reasoned that
If a conraunicator' 3 sincerity is ?>. function of his
degree of commitment to an Idea or cause, and amount of
dissonance is a func ion of desgree of comnitirent, then
a systematic measure of dissonance niight be interpreted
as a systematic ^»asure of sincerity. Perhaps Osgood's
semantic differential technique has some untried possi-
bilities here."o3
If Goyer's opinion that the semantic differential can measure
sincerity and commitment in tonns of the coKnitive dissonance
principle is true, then valuable insir,ht into a debater's
attitude and performance may be achieved.
Justification for the Study
A review of the literature in speech related fields
has Indicated a disagreement over the values of two-sided
debating. Most of the writers as well as the directors of
debate seem to favor the practice, even though responsible
and sincere authorities condemn debating against conviction.
Studies have been conducted by Hay, Capel, Schug, and Welden
in an attempt to discover the relationship between debating
one or both sides of a debate prooosition and changes in a
debater's attitude. These studies provided conflicting
conclusions. New principles and techniques have been
developed since these studies were completed. Two of these
developments are the principle of congruity and the use of the
^2
"Coimitive Dissonance and Communication Theory,"
Central states Speech Journal , XV, no. 2, (May, 1961^.), p. 9k.*
63 Goyer, p. 94*
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semantic differential In neaaurlng attitude. Perhaps th«
application of the soraantlc dif Ter'ential and the principle
of congT^lty to the study of debate and attitude shift xjould
help explain or resolve these conflicts in the literature*
The queetlona which warrant an answer in evaluating
the effects of attitude on effectiveness in debate are:
1, Is there a relationship between the side of
a debate proposition upheld and tho attitude
of a debater toward the proposition^
2, Is there a relationship between the side of
a debate proposition upheld and effectiveness
In debatins the propositionV
3, Is there a relationship between successful
debating and attitude shifts toward the
proposition from the be^inaing to the end of
a debate season?
II. HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the ques-
tions raised in the review of the literature in an attempt
to provide a rationaJe for the theoretical hypotheses basic
to this study.
The first of these questions is: Is there a relation-
ship between the side of a debate proposition upheld and the
attitude of a debater toward the proposition'/ A positive
relationship can be said to exist if it is true that
debaters* debate more on the side of the proposition in
which they believe. The studies conducted by Schug, Capel,
and Krfelden provide clear and strong evidence that debaters
teirf to debate the side consistent to their convictions.
The most impressive of these studies was done by Schug who
found that more than 75 per cent of the debaters studied
debated on the side of the topic that they favored. ^
This conclusion was held by ifliilson and Roosevelt before
the turn of the century when they refused to debate against
conviction. Murphy and i^allace strono^ly Implied that If
debaters' weren't "forced" to debate against conviction that
they would choose to debate on the side in which they believe.
When discussing the concept of tertiary sincerity, Brembeck
64 Schug, pp. 15-16.
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and Howell auggasted that a speaker would "rationalize" hit
position in order "to live comfortably with himself." -' It
does not seem unreasonable to assume that debaters' would
attempt to avoid as much as possible situations which ar«
vincomfortable •
The standard debate practice in Kansas (where this
study as conducted) requires that debaters debate both sides
of the proposition. The most popular tournament procedure
involves six rounds of debate with each team alternating from
one side to the other, debating three times on each side of
the question* Some tournaments have an odd number of debates,
usually five, which requires a debater to debate more on one
aide of the topic than the other. Another practice which
accounts for an uneven distribution of affii^ative and negative
debates is the four-speaker tournament in which each debater
is required to debate exclusively on one side of the topic.
The review of the literature implied that if given a choice,
debaters prefer to debate on the side of the topic they favor.
The presence of the four-speaker tournament and the five-roxind
two-speaker tournament sugf^est that debaters who debate both
sides of a question will not necessarily debate both sides an
equal number of times.
The studies cited in the review of the literature
covered students who debated one side of a topic for an entire
debate season. The question which should be asked is what
happens to debaters who debate both sides of the question?
^5 Brembeck and Howell, pp. 25U-256.
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Can any disproportion of debates engaged in during the season
be accounted for by an examination of the attitude of the
debatert
The first hypothesis Is: Given that debaters debate
both sides of a proposition, they engage In a greater number
of debates on the side of a proposition they favor than on
the aide they oppose.
The second question which this study will attempt to
answer is: Is there a relationship between the side of a
debate proposition upheld and effectiveness in debating the
proposition/ A review of the literature revealed little
theoretical concern with this question. Authorities such as
Beuhler and Monroe contend that sincerity and conviction are
essential to effective speaking; that without conviction a
speech is bound to fail. Brembeck and iiowell stated that
inexperienced speakers (most high school debaters would
probably fall into this class) could be successful only
with primary sincerity; that only the most effective of
speakers would have consistent success with secondary or
tertiary sincerity. Brembeck and Howell define primary
sincerity as unreserved belief in the proposition; secondary
sincerity as believing that the policy advocated is socially
desirable even though the speaker ia personally opposed
to the policy; and tertiary sincerity as sincerity based
on the speaker's personal re^vard from the act of persuasion,
regardless of his personal opinion of the policy advocated,
Brembeck and iiowell suggest that the boost in confidence a
36
speaker receives by being committed to what he says (having
primary sincerity) may help him compensate for deficienciea
In "rhetoric and delivery" which might plague his performance
66
on the opposite side.
The second hypothesis is: Given that debaters debate
both aides of a proposition, they win proportionally mora
debates on the side of a proposition they favor than on the
aide they oppose.
The third of these questions under investigation is:
Is there a relationship between successful debating and
attitude shifts toward the proposition from the beginning to
the end of a debate season. The principle of congruity and
the related theory of cognitive dissonance suggest an affirm-
ative answer to this question. Congruity implies that the
stronger the initial attitude, the less it is likely to change;
and the weaker the initial attitude the more likely it la
to change. Congruity also implies that the more successful
a debater is in debating a given side of the topic, the more
likely he is to change his attitude in the direction of the
more successful side; and the less successful a debater is
in debating a given side of a topic, the less likely he is
to shift his attitude in the direction of the unsuccessful
aide. The degree of the attitude shift should be proportional
to the relative inteasities of his original attitude and his
success in debating each side of the topic. The application
of the congruity principle to a debater's original attitude
^^ Brembeck and Howell, pp. 25i|-257.
39
towar-l the topic and his relative offeotlvenesa In debating
the topic should predict both the direction and degree of
the attitude shift.
The third hypothesis Is: Given that debaters debate
both sides of a proposition, their attitude at the close of
the season will reflect the Interaction of their Initial
attitude and their win-loss record.
III. DEiJIGM OF TEE STUDY
Procedure
This otudy was conducted among high school debaters
in Kansas who debated both sides of the 1963-6i| national topic;
Resolved: That the federal governnient should provide complete
medical care for all citizens at public expense. One hundred
and three atudenfca from fovir high schools and one junior high
school participated in this study. The information obtained
from these students was their pre-seaaon attitude toward the
topic, their post-season attitude toward the topic, and their
win-loss record on both sides of the topic.
A semantic differential was used to identify the
debaters* pre and post-ee&son attitudes toward the topic
debated. One hundred scales were obtained from the literature
on health care programs and used to construct a semantic
differential. This semantic differential was administered to
31 high school students to test the discriminatory values and
polarity of the 100 scales using the "best-worst" technique
67designed by Darnell. The "best-worst" technique required
that the subjects locate the "best imaginable" and the "worst
imaginable" example of a health care program for each of the
100 scales on the semantic differential. The sign test was
used to identify scales which would indicate the polarity of
^7 Darnell, pp. 73-33.
the scales and the ability of the scale to discriminate
between the "best imaginable" and "worst imaginable" health
care program. Over half of the scales tested met the objective
requirements for acceptability. The best 21|. of these scales
(a convenient page of scales) were selected for use as an
attitude measure. The order in which the scales appeared was
randomized and the 2k scales of paired adjectives were
randomly reversed to prevent a set pattern in marking the
scales. A semantic differential using these 24 scales was
administered to debaters in seven Kansas high schools at the
beginning and at the end of the debate season (see Appendix A).
Included with the post-test mailed to each of these schools
was a questionnaire asking for the total nvunber of affirmative
and negative debates and the win-loss record of each debater
on each side of the proposition. Five of the seven high
schools completed and returned the questionnaires.
Statistical Hypotheses and Methodolop;y
The data obtained from the questionnaires were used
to test the following statistical hypotheses:
1) The correlation between attitude scores and the
pxMportion of debates on the side favored equals
zero.
2) The correlation between attitude scores and the
proportion of wins equals zero.
3) The correlation between post-season attitude
scores and the congruity points is not si^nifleant lif
greater than either the correlation between the
poat-season attitude scores and the pre-aeason
attitude scores or the post-season attitude
ecorea and the negative proportion.
The first statistical hypothesis was that no corre-
lation exists between a debater's attitude score and the
proportion of his debates on the affirmative and net;atlv«
sides. It was convenient to convert the subjects markingi
on the pre-test to a njathematical proportion to test this
hypothesis. Each of the seven scale intervals was assisned
a number between one and seven for ease of computation.
Assuming that th;^ scale were "good-bad"; one was assigned the
Interval representing extremely good, two represented quite
good, three represented slightly good, four represented the
undecided category, five represented slightly bad, six repre-
sented quite bad and seven represented extremely bad. In
other words, the numbers one through seven were assigned the
scale intervals consecutively from the favorable adjective
to the unfavorable adjective. The mean attitude score for
each debater was computed. Since the other variables in
this study were reported as proportions between zero and one,
the mean attitude scores wore translated to comoarable scores
by using the formula 6 , The other variable needed to
test the first hypothesis was the debate proportion (Dp),
The debate proportion was acquired by dividing the number of
If a debater's mean attitude score was 2.00
(moderately favorable to the proposition) his score would be
calculated by subtracting one from two (X-1) and dividing by
six, giving the debater an adjusted score of ,17.
k3
negative debates by the total number of debates. ^ The ,00
to 1,00 debate proportion could be compared visually with the
•00 to 1.00 index of attitude. It was convenient here and
neceaiary to the test of the third hypothesis that attitude
scores be in this form. Two separate definitions of "side
favored" or attitude were available for correlation with the
debate proportion. One was the pre-test score measuring the
debaters' attitude at the beginning of the season, the other
was the post-test score measuring the debaters* attitude at
the close of the season. Since both scores were available it
was decided to correlate both the pre-test and the post-test
cores with the debate proportion to test the first hypothesis.
All of the correlations used in this study were Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients. The ,0$ level of confidence
on the one-talled test was set aa the tost for the statistical
sLsniflcance of the correlations.
The second statistical hypothesis was that no corre-
lation exists between a debater's attitude and his affirwatlve-
negative win-loss proportion. Three variables wp^re needed to
teat the second hypothesis; the pre-test scores, the post-
test scores, and the negative proportion (Np). The pre and
post-test scores had previously been used to test the first
hypothesis. The negative proportion combines the wln-losa
recor'' of a debater on the affirmative and negative sides of
the question. To comoiate the negative proportion the total
^*^ If a debater enga, ed in 10 affirmative and 20
negative debates his debate proportion would be 20 divided
hy 30, or .67.
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number of negative wins and afflririative losses was divided by-
total number of debates.' This computation assumes that a
negative win has approximately the same influence as an
affirmative loss and vice versa. The pre and post-attitude
scores could then be conveniently correlated with the negative
proportion since a score of .00 on the attitude measure
represented complete agreement with the proposition and a
score of 1.00 represented complete disagreement with the
proposition, while a negative proportion of .00 represented
singular success on the affirmative side and a negative
proportion of 1.00 repx^sented singular success on the
negative side of the proposition. A correlation was then
computed between the pre-season attitude scores and the neg-
ative proportion as well as between the post-season attitude
scores and the negative proportion to test the second hypothesis.
The .05 level of confidence on a one-tailed test was again
set as the test for statistical significance of the correlations.
The third hypothesis was that the correlation between
post-season attitude scores and the congruity points Is not
significantly greater than the correlation between the pre-
season attitude scores and the post-season attitude scores
'''^
If a debater won 10 and lost 5 on the afrirmative,
and won 10 and lost 15 on the negative, his negative proportion
woxild be 15 divided by ^O, or .38. This procedure was used In
translating the data into proportions in which .00 to .50
always represented proportions favorable to the affirmative
side of the topic while .50 to 1.00 represented proportions
favorable to the negative side. This procedure simplified the
visual interpretation of the data and was convenient for the
computation of correlation coefficients.
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or between the correlation between the noat-aeason attitude
scores and the negative tsroportlon. A con/irrulty rolnt (C)
UBes the pre-test ecore anf^ the nep*atlTe r^rorortion to
predict the post-test score, A oonprulty roint, then, is the
predicted r>ost-tePt score. The formnla T-lli 1 2 t>)-C was used
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to compute the congruity nolnts. Given that the variables
In the formula cited above are the rire-test score and the
ne«;ative proportion? X enuala the nmaller of the two numbers,
Y equals the larfjer number, T^ equals the absolute difference
of X and .50, I2 equals the absolute difference between Y anft
.50, and D equals the absolute difference between X and Y.'*
A eongruity point was coranuted for each subjjeot.
The second variable required to test the third hy-
pothesis was the correlation coefficient between the Dre-test
scores and the post-test scores. This correlation also provided
an index of attitude rasasure reliability and of the consist-
ency of attitudes froiB the beginning to the end of the debate
season. The third variable reoulred to test the third hyooth-
eais was the correlation between the post-season attitude
scores end the negative proportion* This correlation had been
computed to test the second hyrothesis. A t test of the dif-
ference between two correlation coefficients for correlated
samples was used to determine whether the correlation between
71 This formula was an sdaftetlon of Osgood's eon«rruity
formula to a .00 to 1.00 point scale, (Osisrood, r>r. 20^-207,
332-335.)
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' If 8 debater had a r re-test score of .25 and a
negative pror ortion of .85 his conerruity point would be ,65.
If the debater had a pre-test score of ,25 end a ne«rPtive
proportion of .45 his corgruity point would be .28,
post season attitude scores and the congrulty points was
significantly greater than the correlation between either of
the two sets of variables. The ,0$ level of confidence on
a one^tailed test was set as the test for statistical signif'
Icance of the correlations.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCaSSIOM
Description of the Data
The data used In this study were obtained by corre-
lating the pre and post-season attitude scores with the
affirmative-negative debate proportions, the affirmative-
negative win-loss proportions, and the congruity points.
All five variables were translated into proportions between
.00 and 1,00 in which all proportions between .00 and .50
represented relationships favorable to the affirmative side
of the topic and proportions between ,50 and 1,00 represented
relationships favorable to the negative side of the topic.
This information was acquired from an attitude schedule
administered at the beginning of the Sf ason in September,
1963, and at the close of the season in January, I96I4., and
from a questionnaire that asked for the total number of
affirmative and negative debates and win-loss record on eaeh
side of the proposition of each debater.
Statistical Analysis
The first statistical hypothesis was: The correlation
between attitude and the proportion of debates on the side
favored equals aero. Two different measures of attitude were
afforded; the pre-test scores and the post-teat scores. The
correlation coefficient between the pre-test scores and tha
debate proportion (side favored) was ,32 (p<,05). The
correlation coefficient between the post-test scores and the
debate proportion was .23 (p<.05). Since the correlation
between attitude and the proportion of debates on the aide
favored differed significantly from zero, the first null
hypothe&is was rejected.
The second statistical hypothesis was: The correlation
between attitude and proportion of wins equals zero. 'iTie
correlation coefficient between the pre-test scores and the
nagative proportion of wins was -.20 (p>.05). '^'he correlation
coefficient between the post-test scores and the proportion
of wins on the side favored was .07 (p>.05). Since the
correlations between attitude and the proportion of wins did
not differ significantly from zero, the second null hypothesis
was not rejected.
The third statistical hypothesis was: The correlation
between post-season attitude scores and the congruity points
la not significantly (j^reater than either the correlation be-
tween the post-season attitude scores and the pre-season
attitude scores or the post-season attitude score* and the
negative proportion. Since the pre-season attitude scores
would be expected to correlate to some extent with the post-
season attitude scores, and since the negative proportion is
hypothesised to correlate with the post-season attitude scores,
any combination of the pre-season attitude scores and the
^^ Correlations necessary for the .05 level of con-
fidence (one-tailed test) la .16.
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a»gat5.ve proportion Into a congrulty point should result In
a correlation coefficient between the congruity points and
the pofit-seaaon attitude acorea significantly greater than
either of the other two correlation coefficients.
The correlation coefficient between the post-season
attitude scores and the congruity points was .^O. The corre-
lation coefficient between tho pre-season attitude scores and
the post-season attitude acorea was .14.6. Since this corre-
lation coefficient was greater than the .07 obtained between
the post-season attitude scores and the negative proportion
It was used as the standard to teat the significance of the
correlation coefficient between post-season attitude scores
and the congruity points, A J^ test of the difference between
the correlation coefficients for correlated samples was
computed for r=,k^ and r-r.^O. Since the obtained t of .63
was not significant, the third null hypothesis was not rejected.
Summary
The statistical analysis of the data reported In this
chapter seem to Indicate the following:
1. The debaters studied tended to engage in a slightly
greater proportion of debates on the side of the
topic consistent with their convictions than on
the side opposite their convictions.
2. The debaters studied did not win a greater pro-
portion of debates on the side consifitent with
their convictions than on the aide opposite
their convictions.
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3. The congrulty prediction did not seem to account
for the interaction of wins and losses with the
pre-season attitude as a determinant of post-
season attitude.
Discussion
I'he statistical analysis of the data in this study
supported the first theoretic hypothesis and failed to support
the second and third theoretic hypotheses.
Small but significant correlations were found to
exist between the debate proportion and the pre-season and
post-season attitude scores* The support for this hypothesis
was not as impressive as those discovered by Capel, Schug,
and Welden. Since the studies conducted by Capel, Schug, and
Welden primarily studied debaters who debated only one side
of the topic while this study analysed debater* who were
required to debate both sides of the topic, the small, yet
positive, correlation between side favored and the proportion
of debates on each side of the topic would seem to be in
keeping with the nature of the situation in Kansas.
The standard practice in Kansas tournaments requires
that debaters alternate sides in successive rounds of debate*
This practice implies that a Kansas debater would normally
debate both sides of the topic an equal number of times,
The situation which accounts I'or the uneven distribution of
affirmative and negative debates is the presence of a few
five-round two-speaker tournaments and a few four-speaker
tournaments. Four-speaker tournaments and five-round
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two-speaker tournaments allow the Kansas debater some freedom
of choice In the side of the topic h© would prefer to debate.
The greater prooability of freedom of choice afforded by-
debating only one side of the topic mij-ht account for the
iomewhat stronger relationship between attitude and proportion
of afrintative-netative debates found by Capel, Echug, and
i«eldea*
The analysis of the data did not provide support for
tho second hypothesis, 'fhe correlations between attitude and
relative success in debating the afriraiatlve and negative sides
of the topic were not statistically significant. ?wo assuraptions
that were made in providing the rationale for the second hy-
pothesis might be questioned. One of theise assumptions was
that debaters would be more effective if they were motivated
by primary sincerity than they would be if motivated by
secondary or tertiary sincerity. Brembeck and Howell stated
that inexperienced speakers could be successful only with
*^i;primary sincerity but that an audience could not distinguish
between priitiary and tertiary sincerity if the opeaker viere
experienced and effective,'^'^ The second hypothesis ;Tiay be
baaed on an underestimation of the persuasive abilities of
high school debaters. The other assumption was that debaters
allow their attitudes to influence their treatment of the
debate topic. This asEuroption surtgeats that debaters will
exercise greater effort to defend positions consistent with
their attitudes than those positions not consistent with
74 Brembeck and iiowell, p. 257»
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their attitudes. This assuption appears to be related to
the question of open and closed-mindedness in cotnraunication.
Since the analysis of the data failed to demonstrate that
debaters win more debates on the side consistent with their
attitudes, debaters may be keeping their attitude toward
the topic apart from their ability and willingness to debate
both sides of the topic as effectively as they can. This
conclusion would seem to be consistent with the argument of
%rriters such as Thompson, Cripe, and Auer that two-sided
debating encourages open-mindedness and objectivity.
An assumption was made In the test of the second
hypothesis which might also be questioned. The assumption
was that wins and losses are of equal intensity and are
statistically similar concepts. This assumption equates
reward (winning on the side favored) and punishment (losing
on the side not-favored). Eisenson, Auer, and Irwin agreed
that "At an intuitive level, it would seem that reward and
punishment are essential equals and opposites.", but went on
to cite studies which indicated that "... reward is mora
effective than punishment as motivation for learning."
The negative proportion used to teat the second hypothesis
assumed that wins on one side of a debate and losses on the
other aide were equal since negative wins and affii?mative
losses were divided by the total number of wins and losses
to compute the negative proportion. If wins and losses are
75 Jon Elsenson, J. Jeffery Auer, and John V. Irwin,
The Psychology of Coroniunication
. (i^ew York: Apple ton-Century-
Crofta, 1963), p. 99.
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not of equal intensity, then the negative proportion may not
be an accurate index of relative success in debating both
sides of the topic*
The analysis of the data did not provide support for
the third hypothesis. The correlation coefricient between
the post-season attitude scores and the congruity points was
not significantly greater than the correlation coefx^icient
between the pre-season attitude scores and the post-season
attitude scores. Since the congruity points use the in-
tensities of the pre-seaaon attitude scores and the negative
proportion to predict the post-season attitude scores and
since the negative proportion was found to have no signif-
icant intensity relative to the pre-season attitude scores,
then the congruity prediction of the post-season attitudt
scores would be influenced almost entirely by the pre-
season attitude scores.
Suggestions for further Study
Since previous studies reporting that debaters tend
to debate :nore frequently on the side of the proposition
consistent with their convictions analysed primarily debaters
who debated only one aide of the topic; and since one-sided
debaters in previous studies demonstrated a strong tendency
to debate the side favored, while the two-sided debaters in
this study demonstrated some exercise of the freedom of choice
that was available, a study designed to test the difference
between one and two-sided debaters' desire to debate on the
side favored might prove fruitful.
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The rationale provided by euch authorities as Buehler
and Monroe that speakers should be more eixective in advocating
positions consistent with their convictions appeared too
strong to reject too lightly, blnce questions were raised
concerning the measurement of succesa in debating, a study
designed to again test the hypothesis that debaters' win a
greater proportion of debates on the aide favored might be
Justified.
The theories of cognitive dissonance and congrulty
implied strongly that the rewards and pvinlshment which a
communicator received from his communication would modify
initial attitudes in a predictaole manner. A follow up
study designed to test the possible interaction of pre-
season attitude and the relative reward and punishment
received from debating one or both sides of a debate prop*?
osltlon as a method of predicting the degree and direction
of attitude shift ml^ht also be both justified and worthwhile.
APPEKDIX A
PRE AND POST-SEASON ATTITUDE MEASURE
Maae School ^Sex: M F
You will notice that at the top of the following page ia
a topic which ia underlined. Below the topic appears a number
of scales f each one bounded by two words. What you are asked
to do ia to look at the topic, and check each of the following
scales in the place which most clearly resembles your feelings
about the topic.
On the following page ar« scales with adjectives at
each end that look like this:
left i s t t^ I t aright
The intervals on these scales may be interpreted as extremely
left, quite left, slii?:htly left, neither or both, slightly
right, quite right, and extremely right. Of course you are
to substitute whatever words occur at the left and right ends
of the scales.
Here is an example: Suppose the topic at the top of the page
were:
Federal Aid to Education
If the scale below were:
Hone st »
,
: i i t i Pi shone st
And if you felt that the subject of the topic was extremely
honest, you would check like this:
Honest X : : t : J t ^Dishonest
If you felt that the scale didn't apply to the topic at the
top of the page at all, you would check:
Honest s : : X t i i Dishonest
And If you felt extremely negative toward the topic, you
would check like this:
Honest : :
,
: : : : X Dishonest
Work quickly I It is your first reaction to the topic which
is usually the best reaction. Don't eliminate any scales.
Be sure to check after you have rated the topic to make sure
that you haven't missed any scales.
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harmful^,
Medical Care for all Citizens
at Public Expense
] t t t s t
1
^helpful
^.inflexibleflexible^
invalid^.
conatltutional__
effectiTe^
undeslreable^
strong,.
_valid
^unconstitutional
ineffective
desireable
weak
humane
wise_
workable,.
linpractical__
admirable
bad_
dictatorial^
orderly^
juat_
corrective^
Insufficient^
unfair^
worthless^
beneficial^
soimd__
unstable^
sensible^
inhiunane
._unwise
unworkable
practical
_despicable
^^ood
deraocratic
chaotic
unjust
corruptive
sufficient
_fair
valuable
^harmful
unsound
stable
: : : t : 1 insensible
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ABSTRACT
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The purpose of thle study wee to Inveetlgate the
effeote of a <9ebat«r*e attitude towards a debate topic on
his effectiveness in debsting the topic and the effects of
bis dabating of that topie on his attitudes toward the topic.
The hypotheses of this study were:
!• Given that debaters debate both sides of a prop-
osition, they engat^e in a greater nuaber of debates on the
side of a proposition they favor than on the aide they oppose*
2* Given that debaters debate both sides of a prop*
osition, they win px^portionally more debates on the side of
a proposition they favor than on the aide they oppose.
3. Oiven that debaters debate both aides of a prop*
osition» their attitude at the close of the season will
reflect the interaction of their initial attitude and their
wln-loas record.
A semantie differential was used to index the
debaters' pT9 and post-season attitudes. The pre and post-
season attitude scores were correlated with the pronortion
of affirmative-negative debates and with the proportion of
affirmative-negablve wins and losses to test the first two
hypotheses. The pre-season attitude scores were combined
r
with th« debaters ' win-lo8» proportion* to predict the poet- ^^^B
•••son attitude scorea. The poet-aeason attitude acorea wexHi
compared with the predicted poatvaeaaon attitude acorea to
teat the third hypotheala.
A atatiatical analysis of the data supported thm
first hypotheala atid did not aupport the second and third
hypotheses*
